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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the ethics of refugee aid, attempting to answer “Why do States engage 
in refugee aid?” Moving beyond the simplistic answer based on the notion of charity, which 
demonstrably fits ill with the essentially positivist methodology of conducting refugee aid, 
an ethical model is construed based on the Weberian concept of action as an instrument of 
rationality. This is supported with critical readings from Hannah Arendt, amongst others, and 
also my own experiences as a former UNHCR aid worker. However, although this model 
better captures ground realities, it negates the individuality and humanity of refugees. Thus 
refugee aid as a form of global, transnational justice will be presented, based on readings 
from Amartya Sen. 
Keywords: refugee aid, ethical framework, refugee aid as global justice, refugee aid as 




Cet article examine l’éthique de l’aide aux réfugiés. Il tente de répondre à la question 
« Pourquoi les Etats s’engage dans l’aide aux réfugiés ? ». Dépassant la réponse simpliste 
basée sur la notion de charité qui cadre mal avec la méthodologie positiviste dans la conduite 
de l’aide aux réfugiés, un modèle éthique est proposé, fondé sur le concept wéberien d’action 
comme instrument de la rationalité. Un tel point de vue est appuyé par une lecture de Hannah 
Arendt, parmi d’autres, et aussi ma propre expérience en tant que travailleur dans l’aide aux 
réfugiés au UNHCR. Cependant, si ce modèle capte mieux les réalités de terrain, il nie 
l’individualité et l’humanité des réfugiés. Aussi, l’aide aux réfugiés comme forme globale, 
transnationale de justice est présentée, sur la base d’une lecture des travaux d’Amartya Sen. 
Mots clés: Aide aux réfugiés, cadre éthique, aide aux réfugiés comme justice globale, aide 
aux réfugiés comme instrument de rationalité 
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Éste artículo reflexiona sobre la ética de la ayuda al refugiado y trata de responder a la 
pregunta de ¿por qué los estados se comprometen en prestar este tipo de ayuda? Para 
contestar a esta cuestión hay que ir más allá de una respuesta simplista fundada en la noción 
de caridad, pues es fácilmente demostrable que ésta no encaja con la metodología 
esencialmente positivista por la que se rige la ayuda al refugiado, un modelo ético que se 
desarrolla tomando como base el concepto weberiano de acción como instrumento de 
racionalidad. Éste se ha desarrollado a partir de interpretaciones críticas de Hannah Arendnt, 
entre otros y también a partir de mis propias experiencias como trabajadora en ayuda al 
refugiado en UNHCR. Sin embargo, aun cuando este modelo capta bien las realidades del 
terreno, niega la individualidad y la humanidad de los refugiados. Por lo tanto, la ayuda al 
refugiado en tanto forma de la justicia global y trasnacional, será presentada tomando como 
base la perspectiva de Amartya Sen. 
Palabras clave: ayuda al refugiado, marco ético, ayuda al refugiado como justicia global, 
ayuda al refugiado como instrumento de racionalidad. 
 
 





Politicians shake their fists at bogus queue-jumping asylum-seekers. States vie with 
each other to tighten borders. The process of accessing international protection is 
being made more and more difficult. Yet over two thirds of the countries in the world 
(144 to date) have ratified the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 
1967 Protocol, thus publicly and bindingly committing themselves to the protection 
and provision of aid to refugees. 
Why do states provide budgets for refugee aid to people (foreigners, no less) harmed 
by events taking place outside their borders? Given the political climate of the day, 
why not renounce refugee aid altogether? Yet States refrain from taking this ultimate 
step, and UNHCR continues to operate as “the largest and arguably most powerful 
designated humanitarian agency in the world” (Hyndman, 2000, 243). In this paper, I 
consider the theoretical framework of state-sponsored refugee aid and propose an 
alternative ethical modelling of this particular form of humanitarian assistance.  
The question of “why aid?” seems easy at first glance. Refugees should be helped 
because without help, they could die. As Fridtjof Nansen, the first director of the 
Refugee Organization said:  “we cannot let this people (refugees) to starve, that is 
obvious” (Lauren, 1998, 385). In other words, refugee aid is a moral necessity, based 
on a charitable impulse to assist those in trouble. Official and public promotions of 
refugee aid all appeal to this instinct of charity, and aid is generally presented as a 
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kindly act of mercy. It is simply one more humanitarian action in the broad spectrum 
of actions by rich countries assisting those who are less well-off than themselves.  
However, a closer look at the ground implementation of refugee aid shows that the 
methodology and mechanics of refugee aid are conducted in a positivist, or rather, 
pseudo-positivist theoretical framework, which effectively makes mockery of the 
notion that refugee aid is conducted for simplistically charitable purposes.  
 
THE FAILURE OF MORALITY; OR TRYING TO BE A GOOD POSITIVIST OFFICER 
 
It is easy enough for scholars to declare “the official demise of positivism for close to 
half a century”, gently berating those who would make a “philosophical bogeyman” 
out of positivism. (Freidman, 1999, 1) The fact remains that policy-makers and non-
academic social institutions continue to hold a positivist view on the public role of 
social science, as shown by the huge reliance on statistics and the assumption of their 
value-neutrality (Benton et al, 2001). And UNHCR is no exception. 
Consider the process of Refugee Status Determination (RSD), the core procedure 
through which UNHCR and States recognize refugees which “has potentially 
profound implications for the life and security of the individuals concerned” 
(UNHCR, 1992, 1-1). RSD supposes that an impartial and objective decision can be 
made regarding the well-founded nature of fear of persecution in the country of 
origin of an asylum-seeker. The “well-foundedness” is to be established based on the 
answers elicited in response to certain questions made by the RSD officer of the 
refugee in highly structured RSD interviews, and further corroborated through 
rigorously researched and objective country-of-origin information. RSD should be 
conducted “pursuant to transparent and fair procedures”; the applications should be 
processed on a “non-discriminatory manner” and there should be “organization-wide 
consistency” in conducting these procedures (Ibid, 1-2).  
 The RSD procedure perfectly matches Augustus Comte’s description of the “final, 
positivist state”, a state where “Reasoning and observation, duly combined, are the 
means of ...knowledge. What is now understood when we speak of an explanation of 
facts is simply the establishment of a connection between single phenomena and 
some general facts” (Comte, 1975, 40). The knowledge acquired here is the 
recognition of refugee status, based on a series of facts elicited from the refugee and 
his country of origin.  In an ideal situation, any two RSD officers presented with the 
same case would arrive at the same conclusion regarding the refugee status of an 
asylum-seeker. In practice, apart from in exceptionally clear-cut cases or in group 
determinations, this almost never happens.  
My personal experience shows that factors such as the context of the decision-
making procedure, for example, the number of times the officer has considered 
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similar claims and her experience of the “validity” of similar claims, her personal 
sympathies and convictions, the general socio-political climate of the country, and 
even more mundane concerns such as quotas and capacities will affect the integrity 
of the RSD procedure to no small extent. As one scholar put it:  
As these [RSD] judgments are made by a particular person - the decision-maker - 
there is an immediate and inevitable subjective component to this activity. 
Different people may well disagree as to which facts are salient or which parts of the 
testimony are more likely to be true... this regulatory framework is made up of 
understandings and expectations that arise out of the particular legal and 
bureaucratic setting. (Glass, 2008, 213- italics mine) 
The enormous tension arising from the attempt to reconcile a perfectly abstract, ideal 
process to the nitty-gritty on-ground human realities has prompted scholars to 
“question the dominance of the positivist paradigm in refugee law” (Harvey, 1999, 
102): 
References to 'knowledge production', 'refugee voices' and 'deconstruction' all evoke 
critical debates in legal studies which have now, at last, spilled over into critical 
work on refugee law...it is possible to use 'positivism' as a barely disguised term of 
abuse these days. (Ibid, 117) 
 REFUGEE AID AS A STATE INSTRUMENT OF RATIONALITY 
 
I will now turn to the Weberian concept of social action as an instrument of 
rationality as a more accurate model for refugee aid, lying in better harmony with 
ground practices and procedures. According to Weber’s well-known taxonomy, 
social action may be: 
o Instrumentally rational, that is, determined by expectations as to the 
behaviour of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these 
expectations are used as “conditions” and “means” for the attainment of the 
actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends; 
o Value-rational, that is, determined by a conscious belief in the value for its 
own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other form of behaviour, 
independently of its prospect of success.(Weber, 1978, 24) 
The other two types, affectual and traditional, are beyond the scope of this paper; the 
point here is that while refugee aid is ostensibly branded as some sort of value-
rational action, it is indeed simply instrumentally rational- for States, that is. Weber 
further describes instrumentally rational action as “not determined by orientation to 
any sort of norm which is held to be valid, nor do they rest on custom, but entirely on 
the fact that the corresponding social action is in the nature of the case best adapted 
to the normal interests of the actors as they themselves are aware of them” (Ibid, 29). 
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As regards the “normal interests” of states when it comes to refugee aid, the very sad 
observation of James Hathaway is apposite: “To date, and despite rhetoric to the 
contrary, states have simply not been willing comprehensively to limit their 
sovereignty in favour of the essential dignity of the human person” (Hathaway, 2005, 
16). 
States thus fund refugee aid to achieve their own interests, what is called the 
“strategic use of refugee aid” (Hyndman, 2000). The classic example of this lies in 
the origins of modern state-sponsored refugee aid after World War II, when during 
the Cold War, “refugees were perceived as the strongest evidence to demonstrate the 
ideological superiority of the liberal democracies of the West in comparison to the 
communist countries...By receiving political refugees, a state could demonstrate its 
political and moral superiority” (Nathwani, 2004, 14).   
But as Hannah Arendt elaborates on the strategic significance of refugees, she makes 
it clear that it is not simply a matter of vaunting one’s superiority. She considers the 
presence of refugees in a country as “national splinter groups” who “can easily fall 
prey, also, to other ideologies if appealed to international terms” (Arendt, 1994, 149). 
Thus, states may rationally choose to aid refugees in the hope of quelling possible 
dissent which would come from having this group of disposed, discontent and 
displaced persons within their borders, who do not share the national values of the 
rest of their citizenry. 
During a visit to Afghan NGOs operating in Qom in November 2007, I witnessed a 
vivid demonstration of a budding “national splinter group”. “Informal” Afghan 
schools proliferated in Iran following the withdrawal of UNHCR funding for Afghan 
children to attend Iranian state schools in 2002. Registered Afghan children could 
attend state schools, upon payment of tuition fees. However, the large community of 
unregistered Afghan families, including families who move between cities and areas 
in search of seasonal jobs, thus losing their state registration (which limits their 
movements to their district of registration) are denied formal education. Informal 
schools are usually closed if the authorities were alerted- and crop up again in 
different locations. A government member of the Iranian state department dealing 
with “aliens and immigrants” expressed his discontent with Afghan informal schools 
thus: “These schools teach ultra-nationalistic items which are completely contrary to 
known historic facts and the interests of our nation. No wonder so many Afghans 
grow up to commit crimes against the Iranian population who has hosted them so 
generously for the past thirty years. Their informal curricula are completely against 
the law, and this is why, in our opinion, all informal schools should be banned.” 
(personal experience of author- November 2007). This is a clear instance where 
short-term government crackdowns on refugees and refugee education, together with 
the withdrawal of UNHCR aid for schooling, is perceived to harm a state’s long-term 
ideological national interest.  
Ethics of refugee aid  




Another interesting example was the heavy public promotion of the Voluntary 
Repatriation programme for Afghan refugees after the fall of the Taliban. The 
necessity of promoting Afghanistan as a secure and desirable living area for the 
states involved in the downfall of the Taliban hardly needs questioning. UNHCR 
obediently touted figures of returnees and generally hailed the programme as a 
success during the years 2002-2007. It was only after the Afghan refugees began 
`voting with their feet` and repatriation figures dropped that reports of the actual 
living conditions in Afghanistan began to emerge. Even now, reports and figures of 
those suffered hardship or persecution upon return remain few and far between.  
Peter Nyers argues that refugees “represent a conceptual, empirical, and physical 
breach in the relationship between “humans” and “citizens.” Consequently, 
conventional humanitarian responses to refugee crises focus on returning to refugees 
statist identities so as to restore the conditions under which they may once again 
enjoy a properly “human” life as citizens.” (Nyers, 1999) States provide for refugees 
not for any concern for their welfare or human rights, but in an attempt to rein them 
into the “statist” identity, to put an end to their undesirable instability and lack of 
identity, which may somehow spill over to their own citizenry and create social 
disorder, disrupting “the constitutive principles and categories of modern political 
life (i.e.,sovereignty and citizenship)” (Ibid, 23).  
Refugees...must therefore be conceived as objects of the practices of statecraft — 
that is, of practices which are “oriented not so much to care for the needy, the 
displaced, the one in crisis, the refugee, as to produce and privilege the practical 
/representational sources of the state’s claim to territorial sovereignty, namely the 
citizen to which the state owes its raison d’être.” (Navzet Soguk, quoted in Nyers, 
24) 
 
LOOKING BEYOND LABELS: REFUGEE AID AS AN EXPRESSION OF GLOBAL 
JUSTICE 
 
I have moved from how refugee aid is publicized and presented, to a more accurate 
portrayal of the theoretical framework of aid as it is practiced. It cannot avoid notice 
that the latter view presents a bleak, dehumanized landscape, where refugees, or 
rather, stories about refugees are manipulated, financed, controlled, dominated by 
impersonal institutions. Series of statistics of refugees are used for practical 
purposes, while emotional pictures of them are taken for publicity. Where are the 
human sufferers in this system? I now turn to concepts which could help yield a more 
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humane ethics for refugee aid, while remaining aware of the strong political realist 
and positivist arguments for refugee aid, which prioritize the role and will of states.1 
Amartya Sen discusses the concepts of fairness and justice in his article “Justice 
across Borders”, applying a transnational perspective which could be applied to the 
discourse and practice of refugee aid with interesting implications.  
Sen initially defines a just society, where the basic structure is “fairness”. The 
essential point here about fairness is that it is precisely the opposite of the instrument 
of rationality: “people are not guided by their vested interests” (Sen, 2002, 14), and 
thus the rules chosen by this hypothetical society are just. Such a society will not 
prioritize one facet of individual identity (nationality) to the exclusion of all other 
identities (such as professional, gender, religious) that an individual may have (Ibid). 
How will a refugee fare in a society which is guided by fairness, rather than vested 
interest? Can we conceptualize refugee aid, not simply as an instrument for 
furthering or maintaining states’ interests, but (merely) as an expression of justice or 
of the basic fairness that we owe each other, as human beings, regardless of our 
nationality?  
In the present state of affairs, refugee discourse is all about nationality. Although 
nationality is only one of the five Convention grounds for recognizing refugee status, 
it remains the principle reason which gives significance to other grounds. For 
example, an openly gay man who is Canadian would not face persecution whereas an 
openly gay person who happens to be Afghan most likely would. To be Shi’ite in a 
Sunni zone (and vice-versa) is dangerous for an Iraqi person- for a European, it has 
no significance. And of course, becoming a refugee effectively annuls all the other 
identities a person may have. Once you are a refugee, that is your primary identity- 
all your subsequent dealings within the society in which you happen to find yourself 
flow from that identity. An individual may be a teacher, a student, a mother, a 
feminist, a peace activist, but the fact of being a refugee, and a refugee of a particular 
nationality, is what is first and foremost reacted against by States. But why this 
almost arbitrary prioritizing of nationality as our major identifier? When one thinks 
of oneself, is it really the fact of one’s nationality which first springs to mind? Of 
course, the interest of states lies in this prioritization of nationality- that has been 
discussed at length above. But in at least democratic societies, one cannot 
realistically negate the strong link between society and state, and indeed the 
individual and state. Gil Merom argues convincingly that precisely this link 
contributes strongly to prevent democratic states from committing heinous acts of 
barbarity and cruelty (Merom, 2003). Thus, the individual tacitly (or indeed not-so-
                                                 
1
 James Hathaway provides a convincing argument for rendering refugee law on positivist grounds, in 
The rights of refugees under international law, (Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
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tacitly) agrees to the prioritization of nationality by States when it comes to refugee 
affairs (2)2.  
Sen argues that individuals can reach each other across borders and nationalities by 
virtue of their multiple identities, and the commitments and obligations these shared 
identities entail. “The political conception of a person as a citizen of a nation -
important as it is- cannot override all other conceptions and the behavioural 
consequences of other forms of group association” (Sen, 2002, 43).  As Nyers says, 
reading Arendt and Giorgio Agamben, it appears that a “bare” or “naked human” is 
not recognizable, no State will tolerate him or her; they are excluded from the 
political and social sphere (Nyers, 2006, 37-40). And neither is it enough for us to 
extend our sense of fairness. A “bare human” is nothing. But then nobody is a bare 
human. We all have other conceptions and multiple identities of ourselves, and Sen 
argues for strengthening these commonalities across borders. He points to a variety 
of institutions which effectively reach out to these group commonalities and function 
across borders and without the restraint of nationalities: transnational firms, 
Medicine sans Frontieres, Oxfam etc. In the context of the present discussion, I 
would point to Canada’s private sponsorship of refugees as an example whereby 
individuals try to reach across borders to assist each other, brought together by their 
commonalities and shared identities.  
This program allows for five (or more) Canadian citizens or landed immigrants to 
sponsor a refugee, by referring him or her Canadian authorities and pledging to cover 
their financial needs for a year. Although churches have traditionally made strong 
use of the private sponsorship program, now there are a variety of functioning groups 
engaging in this program.  For example, World University Service of Canada 
(WUSC) routinely sponsors students refugees and succeeds in gaining their entry to 
Canada.  
The program is far from perfect, and it is notable that frustration has been expressed 
in particular about the lengthy delays and challenges it faces by the federal 
government, with whom rests the final decision to allow entry to a sponsored refugee 
(Goulet, 2010). Moreover, it is a random, sporadic attempt to assist refugees, too far 
from a systematic and comprehensive refugee aid policy. Yet it is an example of a 
functioning refugee programme in which state interest and positivist methodology 
are not the primary or driving features, and where there is a vivid and tangible, albeit 
limited effort by concerned individuals to connect with others across borders and 
regardless of nationality; a willingness to look beyond the generic refugee label and 
                                                 
2
 A recent manifestation of this phenomenon are the polls conducted in Canada just prior to passing 
the recent law requiring visas for visiting Mexicans and Czechs, in an effort to stem to increasing 
number of asylum seekers from those countries. According to media, two-thirds of polled Canadians 
showed themselves favourable to visa restrictions, and the Canadian Minister was relying strongly on 
these figures. (Fong, P. (18 July 2009), “Majority of Canadians back visa rules, poll finds”, 
TheStar.com) 
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respond to the needs of fellow human-beings by connecting through similarities 
rather than highlighting differences.  Aid is provided freely and spontaneously as a 
willing response to basic need, rather than wrenched out as a grudging, resentful, 
externally-imposed set of obligations, of which only the bare minimum must be met 
to quell unwanted publicity and dissent, which seems to be the face of modern 
refugee aid as provided by states.   
In gaining public support for this type of interest-driven aid, states peddle the 
powerful and evocative Kristevian image of the stranger who has been driven from 
or has fled his home, has travelled across seas and arrived at our border seeking help 
(Kristeva, 1988). This image ultimately harms the individual behind it. It prevents 
societies from seeing refugees clearly and reaching out to them in the same way we 
would if they were recognized as ordinary people, with interests, family members, a 
profession, moral beliefs and religious convictions, much the same as everybody else 
in that society. Kristeva says that we look upon foreigners with “the hatred of 
otherness” (Kristeva, 1988, 21)– but it doesn’t have to like this. “Thus when I say I 
have chosen cosmopolitanism, this mean that I have, against origins and starting 
from them, chosen a transnational or international position situated at the crossing of 
boundaries” (Kristeva, 1993, 16).  
More should make this choice, so that our sense of fairness will not be paralysed by 
the strangeness and fear evoked by the refugee situation. If the members of society 
adopt a fair transnational perspective, states will no longer have licence to 
manipulate human suffering for their own ends, and refugee aid will become an 
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